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Abstract
Since 1960s, logicians, philosophers, AI people have cast eyes on modal logic.
Among various modal logic systems, propositional provability logic which was
established by Go¨del modeling provability in axiomatic Peano Arithmetic (PA)
was the most striking application for mathematicians. After Go¨del, researchers
gradually explored the predicate case in provability logic. However, the most
natural application QGL for predicate provability logic is not able to admit cut
elimination. Recently, a potential candidate for the predicate provability logic
ML3 and its precursors BM and M3 introduced by Toulakis, Kibedi, Schwartz are
cut free. Whereas, the cut elimination proof with the unfriendly nested induction
of high multiplicity is difficult to understand. In this thesis, I will show a cut
elimination proof for all (Gentzenisations) of BM, M3 and ML3, with much more
readable inductions of lower multiplicity.
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1 Introduction
Unlike classical logic, modal logic —developed in the 1960s but arguably having
its roots in Aristotle’s works just as classical logic does— can reason about ne-
cessity, possibility, temporality (Temporal Logic), morality (Deontic Logic), and
beliefs (Doxastic Logic) and finds various applications in Artificial Intelligence
and Philosophy.
People have thought about logic modally in ancient times. Aristotle already
considered a calculus for reasoning with modal syllogistic forms. The topic con-
tinued in the Middle Ages, and we still can find modality (i.e., what is possi-
ble, necessary, or impossible), the core concept of modern modal logic in great
philosopher Kant’s work, even though Kant’s logical thinking mentioned in the
books is different from today’s modal logic. In Kant’s book —his magnum opus—
Critique of Pure Reason [18] (A, pp.70–71/B, pp.95–96) 1 “Modality” was consid-
ered as a form of a judgment 2 along with “Quantity”, “Quality” and “Relation”
defined in Chapter III 3 Under Each “head” 4 Kant identifies three “moments”
which jointly express all possible forms under that head. The definition of three
“moments” of “Modality”:
1There exist two primary publications of Critique of Pure Reason. The first publication is
referred to as the “A” edition and was published in 1781, and the second, or “B” edition appeared
in 1787. Most contemporary editions of the work combine the two editions.
2Kant defined that a judgment is the thought that a thing is known to have a certain quality or
attribute.
3In Chapter III of the Transcendental Analytic, namely, the first division of Transscendental
Logic in Critique of Pure Reason.
4i.e., quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Kant called them ”heads”.
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problematic “A may be B”
assertoric “It is true that A is B”
apodeictic “A must be B”
has been fairly close to some important features of modern modal logic. [16]
Modern modal logic begins with the books of C. I. Lewis, (cf. [9] and [22]),
the second co-authored with C. H. Langford, which included several different
axiomatic systems of modal propositional logic. Lewis (cf. [43]) defined five
systems in the attempt to axiomatize the implication relation: S1 - S5. Two of
these systems, S4 and S5 are still in use today. Lewis’s (cf. [5]) works are in
fact on modal logic, which syntactically explicate (through axiomatic systems)
the notions of logical necessity and possibility.
At this point in history, modal was treated as “a tool for analyzing a wide
range of philosophical arguments” [20] about various modal notions. But non-
philosophical applications were never far away, starting with mathematics. Go¨del
showed how to embed Heytings intuitionistic propositional logic faithfully into the
modal logic (more precisely, into the system S4) in 1933 and briefly mentions that
provability can be viewed as a modal operator. Moreover, Saul Kripke introduced
the now-standard “Kripke semantics” (cf. [45]) for modal logics (later adapted to
intuitionistic logic and other non-classical systems) in 1959. The weakest normal
modal logic K is named after him, [5].
Although the origins of the study lie in philosophy, modal logic has developed
equally intensive contacts with computer science, linguistics, and economics be-
sides mathematics. This circle of contacts is still expanding.
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In topology, Tarski showed how to axiomatize modal structures in topological
spaces in 1938 [43].
Since 1970, modal logic has come to flourish at interfaces with linguistics.
Montague focused on comparing the treatment of intensional operators and verbs
in 1974.
It has also thrived in computer science with dynamic or temporal logics of
programs, logics of spatial structures, or modal description logics for knowledge.
For example, in artificial intelligence area, Dov M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger and J. A.
Robinson introduced temporal logic in their book “Handbook of Logic in artificial
Intelligence and Logic Programming” [17] in 1994.
As to economics, modal logic also has a great impact on many important eco-
nomic theories. For example, Leyton-Brown and Shoham applied modal logic to
the foundation of game theory in 2008 [23].
The traditional modal logic, or modalities of truth, include possibility (“Possi-
bly p”, “It is possible that p”, ♦p), necessity (“Necessarily p”, “It is necessary that
p”, p), and impossibility (“Impossibly p”, “It is impossible that p”). However,
the term modal logic is used more broadly to cover a family of logics with similar
rules and a variety of different symbols. For example, Arthur Prior introduced a
particular modal logic-based system of temporal logic in the late 1950s (cf. [25]
and [26]). Temporal logic has the ability to “represent and reason propositions
qualified in terms of time so the extra modal operators always express the mean-
ing about time” (cf. [14]).
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A list of “modal” symbols of various modal logics and their expected meaning
is displayed in the following table:
Modal Logic Type Symbol Modal Symbol’s semantic meaning
Deontic Logic O It is obligatory that . . .
P It is permitted that . . .
F It is forbidden that . . .
Temporal Logic H It has always been the case that . . .
P It was the case that . . .
F It will be the case that . . .
G It will always be the case that . . .
Doxastic Logic B It believes that . . .
Perhaps the most striking application of modal logic, to mathematical logic, is
in the modal symbol’s modeling of “provability” in arithmetised axiomatic Peano
Arithmetic (PA). This was something that Go¨del noticed early on, and researchers
such as Magari, Kripke, Boolos, Solovay, Sambin, Valentini and Smoryn´ski and
others pursued this area further. The propositional modal logic GL was central in
this development (G for Go¨del, L for Lo¨b). In next section, provability logic will
be discussed more.
G. Boolos and other logicians have stated their belief that a predicate provabil-
ity logic would provide new insights in the study of arithmetised provability in PA
[5]. However, the road to finding an appropriate axiomatized predicate provabil-
ity logic has twists and turns. If one “cheats” and takes as a predicate provability
logic one over the language of QGL, and one starts by defining the set of its the-
orems as precisely those modal formulae all of whose arithmetical interpretations
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are PA theorems, then one arrives at a logic that often is denoted by QML (Quanti-
fied Modal Logic). Unfortunately, QML —as Vardanyan proved [44, 5]— cannot
be axiomatised, hence is unusable! In section 3, we will talk a bit more about
attempts toward discovering a predicate provability logic (for PA).
More recently, work of Tourlakis, Kibedi, and Schwartz [40, 41, 19, 30, 32]
applied predicate modal logic in order to model provability in a general —that
is, “pure”— predicate calculus setting (not only in a particular theory such as
PA). Among these logics, ML3 a common first-order extension of M3 and GL is
most likely a predicate (PA-) arithmetised provability logic —or, as such logics
are usually called, is arithmetically complete. Moreover, a very similar logic with
a different approach to necessitation rule than ML3 is known to be arithmetically
complete ([27]) as we already noted. We observe that ML3, like QGL, extends
GL, but the particular language chosen and the fact that A is always closed give
it properties that QGL lacks, as we already noted in the Abstract. In section 4, we
will take a closer look at M3 and ML3.
Proof Theory is the syntactic study and analysis of the properties and limita-
tions of proofs in a logic, just as Computability is an study and analysis of the
properties and limitations of computations. Cut elimination is “a major powerful
tool for proof-theory” [36], it is related to Gentzen style logic systems, and the
proof-theorist owes it to her/himself to learn what the tool says/does, and how one
proves that a given Gentzen system admits cut elimination. The Gentzenisation of
GL admits cut elimination as originally proved by [42, 28]. In section 5, the syn-
tactic proof of cut freedom for GLS —the equivalent Gentzen sequent calculus of
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propositional provability logic GL will be briefly discussed. Moreover, Gentzeni-
sations of some predicate modal logics such as M3 and ML3 —and unlike QGL—
admit cut elimination as well; we will outline the proof of admissibility for them
too.
Jude Brighton [8] gave a new proof of cut admissibility for GLS with lower
complexity of induction (double induction) than was the case in Valentini’s proof
[42] (triple induction). His key ideas were 1) to state the cut admissibility result
in a very simple (equivalent to the traditional) form, and 2) to do away with the
“width” concept of Valentini and do the (double) induction along the complexity
of formulae (primary) and (essentially) proof tree height (secondary).
The main results of this thesis are two cut admissibility proofs, one each for
the Gentzenisations of M3 and ML3, where we have adapted Brighton’s proof
to the predicate case. Inevitably, our induction is triply nested, an unavoidable
complication due to the presence, and syntactic properties, of quantifiers. Yet,
the new proofs are substantially more readable than the originals [30, 32] and this
simplicity is not only due to the reduction of induction nesting from 4 to 3.
The new proofs are much shorter and more readable than the originals. In the
second half of this thesis, I will more thoroughly explain the motivation of my
work and then present in full detail the two new proofs.
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2 Provability logic
The term “provability logic” has been applied to modal logics where the modal
box operator  is interpreted as “it is provable that”. The predominant version
of “it is provable that” that these logics are called upon to model is the arith-
metised provability within Peano Arithmetic (PA) in that A is (approximately)
interpreted as Pr(pAq), where Pr(.) is Go¨del’s arithmetised provability predi-
cate: Pr(x) “says” that the formula with Go¨del number x is provable in PA.5
Thus, “arithmetised” in “arithmetised provability logic” qualifies “provability”.
By Go¨del number of an expression we mean an arithmetical code for the
expression. Coding of strings (e.g., formulae), and sequences of strings (e.g.,
proofs), by numbers is an idea and technique due to Go¨del, which he employed in
his proof of his first Incompleteness theorem. It has been adopted subsequently in
the study of computability, coding computation snapshots (“configurations”) and
entire computations by numbers. Computability is predominantly using “prime
power coding” but other more sophisticated codings have been used as well, most
notably by Bennett in his PhD thesis On Spectra (cf. [37], Chapter 5).
What is arithmetisation good for? It allows a theory (e.g., PA, Computability
—also axiomatised set theory) that contains natural numbers among its objects of
study to talk and reason about itself, and its processes, whether they are proofs or
computations, since each such process has an alter ego: a number.
5The notation pAq is standard and means the “Go¨del number of expression A”.
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Such provability logics have been introduced in response to developments in
metamathematics such as Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Lo¨b’s
theorem of 1953 [13].
More recently, general provability logics where introduced [40, 41, 19, 32],
where A for classical A means “A is provable within the pure first-order classi-
cal logic”.
2.1 Propositional Provability logic
In 1931, Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorems introduced in [13] put an end to Hilbert’s
Program towards consistently formalising any “real” (one that may deal with in-
finity informally, that is) mathematical theory. Thus, one has a “real” theory R
and a formal theory F and the latter conserves or verifies by finite means (i.e., by
formal proofs) the former’s theorems: If A is provable inR, then it is provable in
F as well —in symbols, if `R A then `F A.
Moreover, Hilbert’s Program required that we are able to metamathematically
prove the consistency of the formalised theory, F , by finite means. This is rea-
sonable! If F can simulate R in a manner that we avoid the informal concept of
infinity, we cannot use this “suspect” concept to assess the trustworthiness (read:
consistency) of F!
This refutation of Hilbert’s Program was achieved by Go¨del adapting the se-
mantic liar’s paradox6 into a syntactic version. He produced a sentence φ that says
6Due to Epimenides. In a subsequently modified form it states, “I am stating a lie”. Well, if this
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“I am not a PA-theorem”. Here is in outline how he constructed φ:
• He arithmetised PA.
• He then defined, within PA, a “search and replace” function, sub(x, y),
which returns the Go¨del number of the formula obtained from the one that
has Go¨del number x if we substitute all free occurrences of the variable v07
in the original formula by the term y.
In plain language, think of the number equivalent (say, in the 0-1 com-
puter representation) of a computer-stored text file as the file’s “Go¨del num-
ber”, x. Let us use the symbol “x” ambiguously to denote both a text
(string of keyboard symbols) and the text’s Go¨del number. Now let us
think of one such text file, x, and let us imagine using a word processor’s
“search/replace” function to replace all occurrences of a substring v0 of x
by a string y. The resulting text is what we call sub(x, y) here.
• He proved the fixed point lemma in PA: For any formula A(v0) there is a
sentence ψ such that PA proves ψ ≡ A(pψq), in symbols `PA ψ ≡ A(pψq).
A proof goes like this: Let the formula B(v0) stand for A(sub(v0, v0)) and
let the closed8 PA term t be the the Go¨del number of B(v0). Then the Go¨del
number of B(t) is sub(t, t). So, we can prove in PA that A(sub(t, t)) ≡
sentence is true, then it cannot be stating a lie; but this realisation has just falsified the statement! If
on the other hand, it is false, then I am not stating a lie; I am stating a true statement; contradiction
again! The original statement of Epimenides, him a Cretan, was “all Cretans are liars”.
7We assume that our formal object variables in PA are v0, v1, v2, . . .
8Variable-free.
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A(pB(t)q) and B(t) ≡ A(sub(t, t)), hence also that B(t) ≡ A(pB(t)q) by
transitivity of ≡. We can then take ψ = B(t).
• Go¨del, having arithmetised PA and the proof processes in it, he then defined
within PA a provability predicate Pr(.) such that Pr(pAq) means “A is a
PA-theorem”.
Clarification: We said “means” above; in what sense? In the syntactic sense
that `PA A iff `PA Pr(pAq).
He then applied the fixed point lemma in PA to define a sentence of PA, φ,
such that
`PA φ ≡ ¬Pr(pφq) (1)
Thus, φ “says” that “¬Pr(pφq)”. That is, that φ is not a PA-theorem. For
short, it says, “I am not a theorem”.
• One can now see that if PA is a consistent formal system, then: One, 0PA φ,
for otherwise we would have (by (1)) `PA ¬Pr(pφq) and, by the Clarifi-
cation (only-if part), also `PA Pr(pφq), contradicting consistency of PA.
Two, can it be that `PA ¬φ? No, for if so, then by (1) we get `PA Pr(pφq),
and by the Clarification (if part) we get `PA φ, again contradicting consis-
tency.
• Why is this fatal for Hilbert’s Program? φ being a sentence, either it or ¬φ
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must hold true in the “real” arithmetic. So one of the two sentences ought to
be provable in the formalised counterpart, PA, as Hilbert’s “conservation”
requires. Neither is!
But wait! Maybe we did not put enough axioms in PA to formalise com-
pletely the “real arithmetic”?
That is not so, as Go¨del showed (but this is beyond the aims of this Thesis to
retell —cf. however [35, 38]): All consistent extensions of PA that continue
to have a recognisable (technically speaking, recursive) set of axioms will
each fail to “verify by finite means (syntactic proofs)” infinitely many valid
sentences of “real arithmetic”!
The second part of Hilbert’s Program, that the formalised theory F (which
conserves the theorems of the real theory R) can be proved consistent (if it is, of
course) by “finite means” also fails, if we take asR the real arithmetic, and for F
we take PA. Go¨del, via his Second Incompleteness Theorem, showed that if PA
is consistent, then it cannot not prove its own consistency. 9 The relevance can
be seen at once: Finitary means to prove the consistency of PA can be arithme-
tised, and hence carried out within PA; the 2nd Incompleteness theorem makes
this impossible.
Although the idea of provability as a modality is hardly novel, the serious
study of the modal logic of (arithmetised) provability in PA did not get under-
way until 1970s. About two years after Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem was
9Using infinitary techniques in the metatheory of PA, we know that PA is consistent.
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published, he introduced a translation from intuitionistic propositional logic into
modal logic (more precisely, into the system nowadays called S4), and briefly
mentions that provability can be viewed as a modal operator. After him, Richard
Montague, Angus Macintyre and Harry Simmons [35] started to investigate the
relationship between provability and modality gradually in 1960s – 1970s.
Smoryn´ski ([35]) gives a very detailed discussion about the relationship be-
tween the modal  operator and Peano arithmetised provability, where, roughly,
 is arithmetically interpreted as Pr(.). The arithmetical interpretation of  ex-
tends to arithmetical interpretations of all modal formulae in a, now standard,
manner. One traditionally uses the superscript ∗ to ambiguously denote any such
interpretation from the modal language to the language of PA, indicating by the
classical A∗ in the language of PA, the interpretation of the modal A. Specifically,
one sets arbitrarily —and that is why we have infinitely many different arithmeti-
cal interpretations— A∗ = A for all modal atomic A. We then let ∗ to commute
with Boolean connectives, and we set (A)∗ = Pr(pA∗q). In one word, the
modal  is able to stand for arithmetised provability in PA.
Besides Go¨del’s theorems, there is another result which was recognised early
on as one that leads abstractly to the proof of the 2nd Incompleteness theorem. It
is Lo¨b’s Theorem. It states:
Let ψ be any sentence. Then: `PA Pr(pψq)→ ψ iff `PA ψ, where, of course,
the if-part is logically trivial (cf. [35, 38]).
No doubt, including the counterpart of Lo¨b’s theorem in modal logic systems
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we would be able to express more properties of PA arithmetised provability.
Before looking at the exact manner of embedding Lo¨b’s theorem to a modal
logic system, let’s take a look at the modal logic system K4, which is defined
below:
Definition 2.1 Axioms:
1. All(boolean) tautologies
2. (A→ B)→ A→ B
3. A→ A
Rules:
Modus Ponens: A,A→ B ` B
Necessitation: A ` A
where the informal provability symbol `, in its use as a binary operator, means
that the right hand side is provable from the left hand side “assumption(s)”. 
Historically, the system K4 was not designed to capture all properties of Pr(.).
The propositional provability logic GL obtained by adding a single axiom —the
formalised Lo¨b’s axiom(A→ A)→ A— to the earlier modal logic K4, this
one introduced to express necessity and possibility, has a fundamental relationship
with PA: All arithmetical interpretations of the theorems of GL —in the sense of
∗ above— are theorems of PA, which we name it as the arithmetical soundness.
But this is also true of the sublogic K4. Significantly, there is a converse proved
by Solovay [36] for the logic GL: for any formula A of GL, if all its arithmetical
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interpretations are PA theorems, then A is a GL theorem. This is known as the
arithmetical completeness of GL. This landmark result of arithmetical complete-
ness is retold in [5, 35].
For this ability to mirror proof activities of PA, GL has been called an “Arith-
metised Provability Logic”.
Kripke semantics introduced by Saul Kripke is useful for the metamathemati-
cal investigation of a modal logic. In Kripke semantics, sentences are true or false
in various possible worlds. These worlds are nodes of a graph, with graph rela-
tion R, and the graph relation properties are induced by the modal axioms. For
example the A → A axiom schema of K4 forces the the R to be transitive,
i.e., whenever aRbRc, then also aRc is true. Arithmetised provability logic has
suitable possible worlds semantics [5] that lead to finite Kripke structures, whose
R is transitive and reverse well-founded, that is, there are no infinite ascending
chains along R: aRbRcRdRe . . .
A Kripke model for propositional modal logic is a triple M = 〈W,R, V 〉,
where W is a set of possible worlds (possibly empty), R is a binary accessibility
relation on W , and V is a valuation that assigns a truth value to each propositional
variable for each world in W . A formula A of the propositional modal logic
under study is true on the world w iff A is true on all worlds x such that wRx. For
Boolean connectives ¬,∨ truth is local: ¬A (respectively, B ∨C) is false on w iff
A is true on w (respectively, B and C are false on w). A formula A is valid in a
model 〈W,R, V 〉 iff it is true on all worlds in W .
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A Kripke frame, or modal frame, is just a pair 〈W,R〉. A frame 〈W,R〉 is
called transitive if R is transitive. It is reflexive, if R (aRa holds for all a ∈ W )
is.
A frame 〈W,R〉 is called reverse well-founded iffR is. Note that reverse well-
founded R are also irreflexive, for otherwise we would have the infinite chain
aRaRaRa . . ..
The theorems of K (that is, K4 with axiom 3 removed; cf. Definition 2.1) are
valid in every Kripke structure, while those of K4 are valid in every transitive
Kripke structure [42]. It is quite obvious that GL is modally sound with respect
to the class of possible worlds models on transitive reverse well-founded frames,
because all axioms and rules of GL are valid on such models. The question is
whether completeness also holds. Unaware of the arithmetical significance of GL,
K. Segerberg proved in 1971 (cf. [34]) that GL is indeed complete with respect to
transitive reverse well-founded structures.
2.2 Quantified GL
Since the time of Solovay’s arithmetical completeness theorem [36], logicians
wondered whether it was possible to have a first-order (predicate) arithmetised
provability logic for Peano Arithmetic as it was assumed that such a logic, being
first-order like the language of PA, would provide more insights in the proof the-
ory of PA. Boolos wrote in his book [5]: “. . . after expressing regret at not being
able to include a treatment of the application of quantified modal logic to proof
theory, I mentioned that one major question then (1979) open was whether quan-
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tified provability logic could be axiomatised”. By “quantified provability logic”
he meant the set of all formulae over a first-order modal language that are PA-
provable under all their arithmetical interpretations ∗. A result of Vardanyan [44],
proves that this set is not recursively enumerable, and hence cannot be (recur-
sively) axiomatised.
The question:
Does a first-order arithmetised provability logic exist?
was posed by Boolos. It was answered in the affirmative by Yavorsky [27] who
proved that a variant of QGL —QGLb— is such a logic, where, unlike the “full”
QGL, formulae of the type A are closed. He also needed the presence of the
axiom schema A → ∀xA presumably to make his Kripke models work, but
he did not discuss this axiom at all. Thus, except for the rule necessitation, which
is primary in QGLb but only “admissible” (derivable) in ML3, the two logics are
very similar and the techniques of loc. cit. should apply to ML3 as well to establish
it as another example of a first-order arithmetised provability logic.
Earlier attempts to build a first-order arithmetised provability logic used pred-
icate extensions of GL, notably QGL (quantified GL) (see [1, 21, 24]).
QGL is the predicate version of the propositional provability logic GL [1]; the
formulae of QGL are those of the modal predicate calculus; the axioms are those
of the classical predicate calculus together with the following two
(A→ B)→ A→ B and (A→ A)→ A
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The inference rules are those (Modus Ponens and Generalization) of predicate
calculus plus the rule called “Necessitation”: A ` A. As in the propositional
case, one can show that QGL contains the schema A → A and is closed
under Lob’s rule: if `QGL A→ A, then we have also `QGL A.
By above features, one might have a reason to expect that QGL can be the
eligible candidate of predicate provability logic.
However, they stumbled upon Vardanyan’s result, the latter of which, to draw
attention to one important parameter in its proof (bolded here), should read:
“If the first-order modal language is such that the free variables of A are also
free in A, then the set of of all formulae over the language that are provable in
PA under all interpretations is not axiomatizable.” [44, 5] Thus, it is a corollary
of Vardanyan’s result that QGL —a straightforward first-order extension of GL
with no new axioms beyond those of pure classical predicate calculus— which is
recursively axiomatised, cannot possibly be a provability logic! (This was also
proved in [24] independently of Vardanyan’s result).
Researchers reasonably expected that QGL can provide more insights in the
study of Peano provability, being itself a first-order logic. QGL does have some of
GL’s interesting properties. For example, QGL satisfies the so-called disjunction
property (as does GL) [1, 39]:
QGL ` φ1 ∨φ2 ∨ ... ∨φk iff QGL ` φi, for some i, 1 ≤ i ≥ k
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Unfortunately, however, many critical properties of GL are not inherited by its
predicate version, QGL. Avron [1] shows in his paper that the most natural se-
quent calculus for QGL does not admit cut-elimination. Subsequently, Montagna
[24] proves that QGL is not complete with respect to any class of Kripke frames;
moreover, QGL is not even arithmetically complete (as we know since [44]), and
does not enjoy the fixed point property.
The technical reasons for the rather disappointing (proof theoretic) behaviour
of QGL point to the particular way A is built in QGL: It has the same free
variables as A.
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3 Two 1st-order modal logics
The presence of free variables in A —in the language of QGL— ruined expec-
tations of it being an arithmetised provability logic. Not only QGL, but QML
(Quantified Modal Logic), the latter a first-order modal logic which is by con-
struction arithmetically complete will not work. QGL, because it is not arithmeti-
cally complete. QML, because it is not recursively axiomatisable ([44]), hence
is unusable to write deductions in it! But logicians do not give up. Contrary
to QGL and QML, the predicate modal logics M3, BM and ML3 introduced in
[40, 41, 19, 30, 32] have a (common) language where A is closed. All three
have Gentzen equivalents that support cut elimination; all three are provability
logics for pure classical predicate calculus; all three are complete with respect to
appropriate Kripke structures. In fact ML3 is complete for finite, transitive and
reverse well-founded Kripke structures, just as GL is, and also being so similar
(except for a rule of inference) to Yavorsky’s QGLb [27], is most likely an arith-
metised provability predicate logic too.
3.1 M3 logic
In a series of Tourlakis and Kibedi’s papers ([40, 41, 19]), M3 and BM were
introduced as a means toward formalising some of the metatheory of classical
equational proofs to make them, as a result, more “mechanical”. In particular,
some informal proof techniques of classical equational logic can be made to pro-
ceed formally and entirely “calculationally” eliminating, for example, the need to
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split equational proofs into disconnected pieces, and thus eliminating a source of
“human” error.
Apropos “human error”, suffice it to note one example of extremely experi-
enced users and researchers in logic who fell victims to it, because they were mix-
ing formal with informal statements: In below case it was the distinction between
the informal (metamathematical) ` and the formal→.
One temptation for error is presented by the generalisation rule: Classical
equational proofs become discontinuous where generalisation must be applied,
because the formula
A↔ ∀xA (1)
is not a theorem. We have A← ∀xA (axiom) but not A→ ∀xA. But we do have
A ` ∀xA.
[15] erroneously invoke (1) above, confusing it with
` A iff ` ∀xA (this is their “9.16”)
in an /δ proof on p.173.
Equational proofs can handle the metasymbol ` formally within any of the
logics M3, ML3 or BM [40, 41, 19, 32] because the informal “A is a classical
theorem iff ∀xA is a classical theorem” is formalisable in them as we outline
below:
The above references showed that for any classical formula B and any set of
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closed 10 classical formulae Γ ∪ {A} we have
Γ, A `CL B iff Γ,Γ `BM or M3 A→ B (C)
where Γ = {X : X ∈ Γ}, while the subscript CL of ` to the left of “iff”
indicates a classical proof —that is, one where no modal axioms are used.11
They called the statement (C) the conservation property (of proofs). It has the
special case (C1) below
A `CL B iff ` A→ B (C1)
Because of (C) or (C1), any of M3, ML3 or BM bypass the difficulty encoun-
tered in an equational invalid proof like
. . .←→ Q←→ A←→︸︷︷︸
↑
invalid
∀xA←→ R←→ . . . (invalid)
that we must split into two proofs in order to make it valid:
. . .←→ Q←→ A and ∀xA←→ R←→ . . . (val)
We must begin a new (branch) of the proof at ∀xA, as in (val) above! However,
because of (C1) the two proof chains in (val) can be recast in BM and M3 —and
10In the cases of M3 and ML3 we do not need the restriction that all formulae in Γ ∪ {A} be
closed.
11[40, 41, 19, 30, 32, 31] employ only classical rules in BM, M3, ML3, and even QGL, by
turning Necessitation into an derived rule.
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as shown in [32], also in ML3— as a single (modal) valid chain with no need to
spawn a new chain:
. . .←→ Q←→ A←→ ∀xA←→ R←→ . . . (valid)
Reference [41, 19] introduces appropriate Kripke semantics for M3 and BM
respectively and prove soundness and completeness: That is, roughly, all theorems
of these logics are valid in all the —appropriate for the logics— Kripke structures
(soundness) and conversely, all valid (in the appropriate Kripke structures) formu-
lae of each logic are theorems (completeness).
The reader will recall that QGL is not compete with respect to any Kripke
structures [24] and admits no cut elimination [1]. By contrast, BM and M3 are
much nicer, as additionally to being complete with respect to appropriate Kripke
structures, their Gentzen equivalent (GTKS, cf. [30]) admits cut elimination.
Logics BM and M3 were designed to support the conservation property (C)
on p.21, and thus these logics formalise the classical `, as , by properties (C)
or (C1). Reference [31] (Theorem 6.4) proves the unexpected result that QGL too
has a weak form of the conservation property for classical proofs, namely:
If Γ ∪ {B} is classical, then Γ `CL B iff Γ,Γ ` B (C ′)
In fact, a somewhat more general result was proved, where the formula B need
not be classical. Of course, in this more general form (where B is not classical)
the proof Γ `CL B will not be classical and one must drop the “CL”subscript.
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Note that even though the quoted result (C ′) from loc. cit. is expressed there as an
“if-then”, the converse (the “only-if”) trivially holds by Necessitation.
The reader can now appreciate the motivation that led to the requirement that
A be always closed:
The BM, as was also the case for the earlier M3, were defined as first-order
extensions of K4 (see Definition 2.1, p.13) with all the pure classical predicate
axioms, plus one new modal axiom schema: A → ∀xA. The intended be-
haviour of , encapsulated by the conservation property (C) above, was forced
by the axioms and the language structure. In particular, by:
• Ensuring thatA is closed in the 1st-order modal language: Because, given
that “` A iff ` ∀xA” holds in classical logic —that is, ` does not care about
free variables— then  must be blind to them too.
• Adding the axiom schema A→ ∀xA to guarantee 12 the logics BM and
M3 can formalise generalisation (the only-if of the quoted statement above).
In classical predicate logic, generalisation is a valid inference rule. It states
that “if A has been derived, then ∀xA can be derived”. There are two flavours of
generalisation:
(i) M3 uses unrestricted generalisation as above.
(ii) BM uses restricted generalisation, where there is a condition on “A has been
12A recent result shows that A → ∀xA is independent of the remaining axioms, so it must
be included as one! [39]
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derived”; that is, “the hypotheses from which A was derived have no formu-
lae with a free x”.
In both M3 and BM, the schemaA→ ∀xA formalises classical generalisation
“if ` A, then ` ∀xA” as long as the context sorts out the presence or not of a
condition on “if ` A”.
3.2 ML3 logic
Retaining the main design criterion of each of BM and M3 —that is, the validity
of conservation property (C)— the authors of [32] introduced a further extension
of M3 over the same modal language, obtained by adding Lo¨b’s axiom schema
(A → A) → A. This common extension of M3 and GL was named ML3.
As it retains the syntax of A it was expected, and this proved to be the case, that
is “well behaved”, meaning that at a minimum it satisfies
• the conservation property (C),
• it is complete with respect to appropriate Kripke structures,
• its Gentzen version admits cut elimination.
The language and some key terminology of ML3 will be outlined here (cf.
[32]) since we will focus our mind on the equivalent Gentzen-style logic for ML3
later:
The set of logical axioms of ML3 is Λ ∪ Λ ∪ Λ, where Λ consists of all
instances of the following basic schemata:
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(1) All tautologies
(2) ∀xA[x]→ A[a]
(3) A[a]→ ∀xA[x], provided a does not occur in A.
(4) ∀x(A→ B)→ (∀xA→ ∀xB)
(5) (A→ B)→ A→ B
(6) (A→ A)→ A
(7) A→ ∀xA
There are two primary rules of inference. Modus Ponens (MP) “from A and
A→ B inferB”, and (unconditional) generalisation (Gen) “fromA, infer (∀x)A”.
In symbols, these rules are denoted by
A,A→ B ` B and A ` ∀xA
Compared to the precursor M3, ML3 doesn’t include the axiom schemaA→
A explicitly, but we can derive it as a theorem in ML3 due to the “trick” of
adding Λ to its logical axiom set: Λ∪Λ∪Λ —by comparison, M3 does
not have theΛ part. It is however often convenient to think of ML3 in a slightly
alternative manner: We start with exactly the same axiom set as M3, including
A→ A, and we simply add Lo¨b’s axiom schema and also remember to add
the boxed Lo¨b’s axiom schema in order to update Λ. In this approach we drop
Λ as redundant. Finally, if we were to add necessitation A ` A as primary
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rule as [27] does for QGLb, then we do not need Λ either. The role of Λ in
proving necessitation as admissible is fully expanded in [40, 41].
Not having necessitation as primary rule has many technical advantages, in
particular in the application of the “formulator” tool (introduced in [32] and fur-
ther used in [39]) in the metatheory of ML3.
ML3 shares the same language as BM and its predecessor M3, thus it too
requires its formulae of the type A to be always closed. This enables ML3 to
formalise and simulate the classical pure predicate calculus `—the logic supports
the exact same version of (C) (p.21) as M3 does, that is, there is no requirement
on Γ, A to be closed [32]. Notably, the Gentzen equivalent of ML3 called GLTS
in loc. cit., is cut free but the cut rule is admissible (provable) [32] —this is a
cut elimination result in reverse (like the ones for BM and M3 [30]). Moreover,
it is complete with respect to finite transitive and reverse well-founded Kripke
structures.
It is also arithmetically sound for arithmetical interpretations, ∗, over PA, just
like M3 and QGL. Arithmetical soundness states, “If `ML3 A, then for every arith-
metical interpretation mapping ∗, we have `PA A∗” [32]. We conjecture that ML3,
differing from QGLb of [27] only in how necessitation is handled, is arithmetically
complete as well. We do not explore this question in this thesis where our objec-
tive is to improve cut elimination proofs in modal 1st-order Gentzen-style logics.
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4 Cut Elimination
Users of mathematical logic in mathematics are usually using a Hilbert-style log-
ical calculus that relies on a lot of axioms but only one or two rules of inference.
For example, in propositional calculus, there are several axioms such as the fa-
mous one —Excluded Middle— A ∨ ¬A, but only one rule of inference exists,
namely, Modus Ponens A,A→ B ` B.
Many who study, rather than do, logic and proofs prefer to use syntactic tools
in their study, or as we say are doing “proof theory” — which is a particular aspect
of “logic metatheory”. Proof theory is a research tool for the syntactic study of a
logic system, in contrast to model theory, which is semantic in nature. In Proof
theory, proofs are represented as formal mathematical objects that obey certain
rules of construction (the rules of inference of the logical system) [29]. Not only
proof theory has been applied in logic research mainly, but also more and more
practical methods rooted from proof theory such as proof mining and automated
theorem proving has been applied in computer science, linguistics and philosophy
widely. The direction of my research is to continue —after my Masters— working
in the area of proof theory of first-order modal logic.
For those who do proof theory, the most appropriate formulation of the logic
they study is Gentzen’s Sequent Calculus that has a lot of rules of inference but
no axioms!
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Gerhard Gentzen gave birth to the sequent calculus. The first sequent calculi,
systems LK and LJ were introduced in 1934–1935 by his [10] and [11] as a tool
for studying natural deduction in first-order logic (see also [5]). According to his
paper [10], the presence of sequents is the predominant characteristic of sequent
calculus. An expression like Γ ` ∆ is called a sequent, where the symbols Γ
and ∆ represent sets of formulae. A sequent stands for the informal statement
“the conjunction of the formulae in Γ proves the disjunction of those in ∆”. Γ
in a sequent Γ ` ∆ is given the name “antecedent” and correspondingly, ∆ is
the “succedent” where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulae [28]. A (formal) proof
in the sequent calculus is a sequence of sequents, where each of the sequents is
derivable from sequents appearing earlier in the sequence by using one of the rules
of inference such as
Γ ` A,∆
Γ,¬A ` ∆ . All rules, except two “initial” rules, are written
as fractions that are applied as follows: If we have proved all the sequents of the
numerator, then we have also proved (and therefore can write down) the sequent
of the denominator. The initial rules have no numerators but are single sequents;
these can be written outright, essentially, exactly like the axioms in a Hilbert-style
proof.
Gentzen-style systems have significant practical and theoretical advantages:
On the practice side, in Software Engineering area, “Event-B”, the popular formal
method for system-level modelling and refinement takes advantage of sequent cal-
culus to validate models and verify consistency between refinement levels within
a safety-critical system, such as Railway signalling and control systems and Emer-
gency services dispatch systems. Concretely speaking, in the “Rodin” platform —
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an Eclipse-style integrated development environment designed for Event-B pro-
gramming— In each “machine” (an ioslated system) or “context” (the underlying
environment of all systems), users are able to manually apply Gentzen style de-
ductions, or Equational style deductions for “invariants proof” 13 when they’re dis-
charging “Proof Obligation” 14 in “ProB” 15 model checker view, which is helpful
for model validation.
Another instance of practicality is in resolution proofs.
Prolog is a programming language in which the underlying computation mech-
anism is logical deduction. The deduction process used by Prolog has been ex-
plained as a form of resolution. Michael Besson showed that Prolog is intimately
connected with Gentzen’s cut-free sequent calculus. In his paper, Prolog computa-
tion can be viewed as the construction of certain cut-free derivations.[3] (pp.101–
116)
The Gentzen formulation of logic is particularly suited for metatheoretical, in
particular proof theoretical (i.e., syntactic metatheory) study, especially if the sys-
tem admits cut elimination as we say, that is, if it can be formulated without the
cut rule without loss of deductive power because we were able to show that the
cut rule is derivable from the remaining rules!
13“Invariants proof” is the proof provided by users that every system invariant is always main-
tained during the change of all system or local variables.
14Proof Obligation means the initial values of the variables declared in a machine or context
must satisfy the invariants of the machine or context.
15ProB is an animator, constraint solver and model checker for the “Event-B” description lan-
guage. It allows fully automatic animation of B specifications, and can be used to systematically
check a specification for a wide range of errors.
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Note that not all Gentzen systems admit cut elimination! The system for QGL
does not, as we have noted earlier.
What is the Cut Rule? It is a generalisation of modus ponens, and the Gentzen
style formulation is this:
Γ ` ∆, A A,Σ ` Φ
Γ,Σ ` ∆,Φ
A is the cut formula and is “cut out” after applying the rule since it does not appear
in the conclusion sequent (denominator).
Why is the absence of the cut rule as a primary rule good?16
Actually, the presence of cut rule as primary is a big headache for proof the-
oretic study of proofs, as it hinders application of induction because the “numer-
ator” (hypothesis) of the rule contains a formula, A, that does not occur in the
“denominator” (conclusion) —in fact the conclusion is less complex than the hy-
pothesis and this would ruin the induction step if induction relies on the complex-
ity! Without cut rule, the sequent on “denominator” of any other rule gets more
complex than the sequent on “numerator” so that induction on the complexity of
sequents works well.17 In fact, cut-free proofs in a Gentzen style logic have the
subformula property, that is, all formulae appearing prior to the proved theorem
16All rules given in the definition of a logic are called primary. The ones that were not included
definitionally, but we can prove as theorem-schemata are called “derived” or “admissible”.
17This claim depends on the type of the remaining rules, but is supported by the usual rules one
employs in a Gentzen logic.
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are subformulae of the theorem.18
The cut rule can be eliminated in many systems of interest —that is, it is
provable from the other rules of the sequent calculus— as Gentzen proved for
LJ and LK [10] and [11]. The (meta)proof that the cut rule is derivable or ad-
missible is called cut elimination proof. In 1964, Gentzen in his landmark paper
“Investigations into Logical Deduction” [12] provided the complete details of cut
elimination proofs for the systems LK (classical) and LJ (intuitionistic).
After Gentzen’s work, several logicians turned attention to the cut elimination
for various known modal logic systems. As these systems were invariably defined
as Hilbert style, a technique emerged (e.g., [42, 28, 21]) to build a Gentzen equiva-
lent —a “Gentzenisation”— of the under metamathematical study logic and study
instead its Gentzenisation. For example, as to obtain cut elimination proofs of KS
system (KS = LK + the modal rule KR) —where KR is
Γ ` A
Γ ` A— [28] men-
tioned that it is necessary to change the definition of “rank”19 of cut formulae and
in the same paper they presented a cut elimination proof for system K4S —that is,
the Gentzenisation (“S” for Sequent) of the modal logic K4— (K4S = LK + the
modal rule TR20). Generally speaking, the cut-elimination theorem states that any
provable sequent can also be proved by a cut-free proof, that is, a proof that does
not make use of the cut rule. The cut-elimination theorem is also called “Gentzen’s
18A is a subformula of Γ ` ∆ iff it is a subformula of at least one of the formulae appearing in
the sequent.
19A concept of Gentzen’s that our approach does not use, and we will not define.
20See p.37.
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Hauptsatz” and has become a significant proof-theoretic tool. The article of [33]
shows many applications including some for PA. Whether the Gentzenisation of
a logic system admits cut elimination is a critical measurement of our ability to
study the logic proof theoretically.
4.1 Cut-elimination for (the Gentzenisation of) GL
Prior to finding syntactic proofs of cut elimination for the Gentzenisation of GL,
logicians discovered model theoretic proofs at first. Logicians Sambin and Valen-
tini successfully provided a cut elimination proof for propositional provability
logic GL by using a semantic method in the paper “The Modal Logic of Provabil-
ity: the Sequential Approach” [28]. At first, a Gentzen style system called GLS,
which consists of system LK plus GLR modal rule,
Γ,Γ,A ` A
Γ ` A
was described in loc. cit. and was proved to have exactly the same theorems as GL,
therefore GLS is the Gentzenisation of GL. They then offered a semantic proof of
cut elimination for GLS by a method of searching proofs backwards (from the
theorem, back towards the axioms that were used in its proof.)
However, the path to a cut elimination (syntactic) proof in proof theory is a
zigzag.
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Leivant [21] proposed a syntactic Gentzen-like proof of cut elimination for the
Gentzenisation of GL in 1981. Although some statements is correct, the “alleged
proof” was wrong. Arnon Avron [1] pointed out Leivant’s mistake —applying the
induction hypothesis incorrectly— in his paper “on Modal Systems Having Arith-
metical Interpretations” . In the meantime, Sambin and Valentini believed that
Leivant’s proof was untenable [28]. Consequently, in the later paper [42] Valen-
tini with Sambin’s help constructed a counterexample against Leivant’s proof ac-
cording to Leivant’s definition of “secondary grade”. In that counterexample, if
someone needs to eliminate two sequential cut rules at the bottom of the proof,
Leivant’s reduction would bring them to an infinite loop.
Not only a counterexample, but also a wonderful —but quite complex— syn-
tactic proof of cut elimination for GL was given by [42]. Since Gianluigi Bellin
in his paper “A system of natural deduction for GL” [4] suggested a rather com-
plicated proof in which no measure of the complexity of the used reductions was
provided, Vanlentini introduced a very clear definition of the essential parame-
ters, degree δ, rank r and width n —the latter a rather complicated notion! The
induction was a triple induction on the ordinal
δ(A)ω2 + n(A)ω + r(A)
associated with the cut formula A. In simple words, the triple induction views
the triple of numbers (δ, n, r) lexicographically where δ is in the most significant
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position and r is in the least one.
There have been several successful attempts to give a syntactical proof of cut-
elimination for (the Gentzenisation of) GL with different approaches after Van-
lentini’s proof. Among them, Marco Borga’s proof [6] is a very impressive one.
In Borga’s paper, merely a double induction on grade and rank was used just as in
Gentzen’s paper. Unsurprisingly, proof was based on a modification of Gentzen’s
approach [6].
Entering 21 century, J. Brighton ([8]), presented a double induction proof of
cut elimination for the Gentzenisation, GLS. In his paper, Brighton came up with
a fairly different method compared to Valentini’s [42] or Borga’s.
In [28], Sambin and Valentini showed that, given Γ,∆, sets of formulae, it is
possible to find out whether Γ ` ∆ is derivable or not in GLS ′ (which is equiva-
lent to GLS, but has no cut rule) by inverting its inference rules and thus obtaining
a finite number of “backwards” (along the proof) search trees, and then checking
whether any of them is a legal proof (tree) in GLS ′. They also showed that the
height of each search tree is finite. Brighton converts this idea into a simple syn-
tactic proof by a double induction on formula complexity (primary induction) and
search tree height (secondary induction). He calls his search trees “regress trees”
and retains the backwards rules of [28]. The breakthrough in his proof are two
simple facts:
• The Gentzen cut rule is equivalent to the rule: Γ, A→ A ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
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• All rules of the Gentzenisation (except the GLR rule) of GLS ′ are re-
versible, that is, if the denominator is a theorem, then so are the sequents in
the numerator.
Each fact contributes tremendously to the simple proof!
This thesis adapts Brighton’s proof to the predicate modal case for the Gentzeni-
sations of M3 and ML3.
4.2 Cut elimination proof for Predicate Modal Logic
After Valentini’s success on cut elimination of GL, naturally more and more lo-
gicians turn to seek cut elimination proof for Gentzenisations of predicate modal
logic.
Unfortunately, the most natural predicate extension for provability logic, QGL,
doesn’t admit cut elimination at all [1]. Valentini admitted that his proof for GL
couldn’t work well for the predicative case because of one induction hypothesis
that cannot be always valid. Later, Avron proved that cut elimination fails for QGL
[1]. Montagna also added to the negative results about QGL [24]. Its failure at cut
elimination and the results in the last reference illustrate again that QGL cannot
offer a complete description of the logic of (arithmetised) provability. There is a
clear need for alternative approaches to first-order modal logic!
How about the predicate modal logics BM, M3 and ML3? These are not given
as Gentzen style systems, but nor is QGL. They are defined as Hilbert-style logics
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as is the custom for logics meant to be used rather than studied. However, as we
learnt from the work of [42, 28, 21, 1, 24] and others, a rich proof theory can be
developed for them if one can find equivalent Gentzen logics (Gentzenisations)
for them, for which the cut rule can be proved to be redundant.
Such Gentzenisations exist.
The Gentzen style first-order modal logic system named GTKS —equivalent
to BM and, with a tweak,21 also to M3— was defined and studied in the paper
“On the Proof-Theory of two Formalisations of Modal First-Order Logic” [30].
These two logics, as I mentioned earlier, were originally introduced and studied
in [40, 41, 19], but this study was carried in the semantic metatheory via Kripke
models. [30] focused on the syntactic metatheory —the proof-theory— and set
sights primarily on cut-elimination for these logics. Instead of including the cut
rule in system explicitly like LK did, the authors of loc. cit. introduced GTKS as
a cut-free system (in the style of [29]) and proved that the cut is an admissible
rule —a “backwards” cut elimination result. Following [28] they also added a
“modified TR” modal rule in GTKS
∀Γ,Γ ` A
Φ,Γ ` A,Ψ (1)
21Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [30] state respectively: GTKS proves Γ ` ∆ iff Γ `BM
∨
∆ —where∨
∆ is the disjunction of all formulae in ∆.
But, for M3:
If GTKS proves Γ ` ∆, then Γ `M3
∨
∆. Conversely, if Γ `M3 A, then ∀Γ `GTKS A. Note
the “∀Γ”. The difference is because BM has the weak generalisation rule (derived) while M3 has
strong generalisation as a primary rule. The generalisation in GTKS is weak. See also rulle (6),
p.44.
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The original TR of [28] was
Γ,Γ ` A
Γ ` A (TR)
introduced by these authors for the Gentzenisation of the propositional modal
logic K4. What TR (and (1)) does in particular, is it proves A→ A.
The reason [30] called rule (1) a “modified TR” was
• They added universal closure 22 ∀ in the numerator of the original TR rule,
needed in the new first-order setting in the theorem that proves the equiva-
lence of GTKS and M3
• What is most worth mentioning here is that, in GTKS system, weakening
and strengthening rules are not primary —unlike the LK case— to facili-
tate metatheoretical inductions. To recover weakening and strengthening as
admissible rules, one of the tricks used was to integrate weakening (Φ) and
strengthening (Ψ) into the modal rule (1).
Four years later, the paper “On the Proof-Theory of a First-Order Extension of
GL” [32] introduces the common first-order extension of GL and M3 that they
name ML3 and develop its proof theory. Again, the proof theory is developed
in an equivalent brand new Gentzen system they introduce, GLTS. This again is
22For a formula A, ∀A is shorthand, where the prefix ∀ indicates a string of ∀x components,
one for each free variable x of A. Thus we derive a new formula which is provable iff the original
was, but the new one is rendered closed via repeated universal quantification; “universal closure”.
For a set Γ, ∀Γ = {∀A : A ∈ Γ}.
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influenced by [28] in that the modified “GLR” modal rule (2) below is used:
∀Γ,Γ,A ` A
Φ,Γ ` A,Ψ (2)
Just as for GTKS and TR, the “modification” here adds weakening and strength-
ening in the denominator, and replaces Γ by ∀Γ in the numerator. [32] tell us
how the equivalence between ML3 and its Gentzenlation is formulated in detail:
If Γ ` ∆ is provable in GLTS, then Γ `ML3
∨
∆. Conversely, if Γ `ML3 A, then
∀Γ ` A is provable in GLTS [32].
The definition of the Gentzen-style sequent calculi GTKS and GLTS is in-
fluenced by Schu¨tte’s book “Proof Theory” [29] in two important aspects. No
primitive weakening/strengthening rules, and no primitive cut-rule are included in
these two logic systems. Recall that the classic systems LK and LJ do include the
weakening/strengthening rules (“structural rules” as Schu¨tte calls them) and the
cut rule explicitly as primitives [28]. As in Schu¨tte, the “cut elimination theorem”
is more like a “cut introduction theorem”: cut is an admissible rule [29]. One
thing needs to be said: except for the modal rule (TR in GTKS, GLR in GLTS),
the other primitive rules are common in GTKS and GLTS systems. The precise
description of GLTS and GTKS, including all their rules, will be introduced in the
last section of the thesis.
The good news is that both admit cut elimination whose proof was presented
in two papers of Schwartz and Tourlakis [30, 32]. Strengthening and weakening
are proved to be admissible within both GTKS and GLTS systems, and they, of
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course, help in the proof of the cut-introduction (“cut is admissible”) theorem for
these logics. Equally helpful is the “inversion theorem”, which says that certain
rules are reversible, that is, if the denominator is provable in GTKS (resp. GLTS),
then the numerator(s) is/are too.
The cut admissibility proof for GTKS is principally by induction on the mod-
ified complexity of the cut formula A and secondarily on the derivation orders for
Γ ` A,∆ (order ≤ m) and Θ, A ` Φ (order ≤ n). The “modified complexity” is
the name given to the ordinal ω ·k+ r where k counts occurrences and r counts
the total of all→,∀ occurrences in A [30]. This neat concept means that of two
formulae A and B, the one with more boxes  is more complex than the other,
even if the latter has more occurrences of→ and ∀. The proof is a relatively com-
plex triple induction modelled after Schu¨tte’s classical Gentzen predicate calculus
cut admissibility proof [29].
The cut admissibility for GLTS is quite complex, imagine adding a layer
of complexity to the [42] proof, required because of the quantifier rules. It is
a quadruple induction with primary component the modified complexity C of
the cut formula A. The secondary induction is on the width W of the sequent
Γ ` ∆, A.23 Moreover, the tertiary and the quaternary inductions respectively are
on the derivation orders for Γ ` A,∆ (order ≤ m) and Θ, A ` Φ (order ≤ n)
[31]. Obviously, a quadruple induction and the width concept (see [42, 32]) make
the proof difficult to understand!
23The admissibility statement to prove is “if GLTS proves Γ ` ∆, A and Θ, A ` Φ, then it can
also prove Γ,Θ ` ∆,Φ.”
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5 New simplified proofs for cut elimination
Cut-elimination/simulation proofs in general have been long, but also extremely
complicated, especially in the presence of the modal operator. In this thesis I want
to contribute to the work of [40, 41, 19, 30, 32] and make an improvement on the
cut elimination proofs for the Gentzenisations of M3 and ML3 contained in the
last two references.
The cut elimination proofs for GTKS and GLTS in [30, 32] will likely tax all
but the most expert readers because of their relatively high complexity. It will be
useful to have alternative simple and readable proofs with significantly less com-
plexity.
So, The improvement we want to effect will be in the area of reducing the
proof’s complexity, and improving its readability.
Complexity is a general and somewhat arbitrary term for a proof. It can be
length of proof, but I also chose as additional metric in induction proofs: the
depth of nesting of the induction hypotheses (I.H.) as dictated by the multiplicity
of the induction: double, triple, etc., with 2, 3, etc., nested I.H. Such inductions
are common in cut elimination or cut admissibility proofs. Gentzen’s original
induction proofs for LK and LJ were via double induction. Higher induction
nesting level, length of proof, and complex concepts employed, such as width,
contribute to a very complex proof. For example, Leivant’s incorrect proof of cut
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elimination for GL in [21] was the victim of complexity, where he did not notice
that he misapplied one of the multiple I.H.!
Let’s review the complexity of cut elimination proofs in the literature:
The original cut elimination proof of Gentzen’s for LK was long and hard
to read in his [12], even though it was only a double induction! The fact that
weakening/strengthening were primary rules made things messy! In GTKS and
GLTS these rules are derived.
Valentini [42] employs a triple induction to obtain cut freedom for (the Gentzeni-
sation of) the propositional GL introducing a very hard to understand concept of
sequent Γ ` ∆, A width (where A is the cut formula) as a parameter for the sec-
ondary induction!
For (the Gentzenisation of) M3, GTKS, [30] uses a triple induction and is
based on ideas of logician Schu¨tte [29].
Logicians Schwartz and Tourlakis use in [32] four induction hypotheses in a
quadruple induction —one more nesting level than in [42] because of quantifier
rules— to obtain cut elimination for their ML3 logic! They also used width, as in
Valentini, and that made their proof very hard to understand!
Looking at above inductions, one may ask if it is possible that a cut elimina-
tion proof with less complexity exists for GTKS and GLTS. The answer is “yes”.
As mentioned above, J. Brighton [8], presented a double induction proof of cut
elimination for GLS logic system. Brighton’s method inspires the people working
not only on GL and similar propositional modal logics but also in the predicate
modal logic case. The excellent extensibility and transferability of his method
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suggests that people should be able to devise much more readable inductions of
lower multiplicity that present a significant simplification from the originals. I
wanted to apply this methodology to (Gentzenisations) of M3 and ML3! I worked
on this simplification throughout my Masters research and study and eventually
succeeded. In next section, I will demonstrate two such simple and readable cut
admissibility proofs.
5.1 Two Gentzen-style modal first-order logics
The rules for the Gentzenisations of M3 and ML3 are given in the next two defini-
tions (cf. [30, 32]). Upper case Latin letters stand for formulae while upper case
Greek letters Γ,∆,Ψ,Σ (and other choices that are not also Latin capital letters)
stand for finite sets of formulae; so do primed such letters. The expression Γ ` ∆
is called a sequent and intuitively says that the set of hypotheses (formulae) in
Γ proves the disjunction of the formulae in ∆. Γ is the antecedent part of the
sequent, while ∆ is the succedent. “Γ, A” and “A,Γ” mean Γ ∪ {A}.
We will not repeat the description of the common language of all four logics
(M3, ML3, GTKS and GLTS) in detail, but we will revisit the less standard points
here. In fact, we will not define M3 or ML3 in this section (but see Section 3.2),
since the sole purpose of this section is to offer simplified cut admissibility proofs
for GTKS and GLTS; the latter two logics we define here in detail.
The primary connectives are ⊥,→,∀,. There are two types of (object) vari-
ables, free (a, b, c, a′, c′′, a0, b12, etc.), and bound (x, y, z, x′, y′′, z0, x12, etc.). The
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syntax of formulae ensures that A is a sentence, for all formulae A.24 The ex-
pression, A is metanotation for the expression obtained from A as follows: (1)
Replace all free variables that occur in A by the lexicographically smallest25 un-
used (in A) bound variables xj1 , . . . , xjk ; this results to an expression we will call
A′. (2) Let α represent the string formed by arranging the used in (1) bound vari-
ables in their lexicographic order. (3) Then “A” names the string αA′. Note
that if A has no free variables, then the meta name A names itself (that is, A is
the same string as A′ and α is empty).26
For any expression F ,27 F [a] or F [x] indicates that we want to pay attention to
the free variable a or bound variable x that possibly occur in F . In the context of
the notation F [a], F [t] denotes the result of replacing a by t, everywhere in F —
an operation on the expression F that we will on occasion denote more explicitly
by “F [a := t]”. The [a := t] operation has the highest priority, so, for example,
A→ B[a := x] stands for A→ (B[a := x]).
∀xA[x] (or just ∀xA) are metanotation for our familiar “for all values of x,
A[x] holds”. Thus, provided that x does not occur in A, ∀xA[x] names ∀xA[a :=
x], for some a known from the context. Note that in the last expression [a := x]
applies to A before ∀x does.
24The motivation and rationale for this choice of an “opaque”  vs. the “transparent” one in the
case of QGL has been explained elsewhere (in this thesis —p.23, first bullet— and at length in
[40, 41, 30, 32, 31]) and will not be repeated here.
25The infinite set of bound variables is finitely generated as suggested above from the alphabet
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ′, x, y, z}, whose members we list here in the intended increasing order.
26This description and use of A as metanotation parallels the one in Bourbaki ([7]) for the
meta-expression τxA.
27This expression could be a formula A, a set of formulae Σ, or a sequent Ψ ` Ω.
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Definition 5.1 (GTKS Rules [30])
(1) Initial rules: Γ, A ` ∆, A and Γ,⊥ ` ∆, where A is atomic.
(2) →- left rule: Γ, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ Γ, B ` ∆
Γ, A→ B ` ∆ , where B is not ⊥.
(3) →- right rule: Γ, A ` ∆, B
Γ ` ∆, A→ B
(4) ⊥- right rule: Γ, A ` ∆
Γ ` ∆, A→⊥
(5) ⊥- left rule: Γ ` ∆, A
Γ, A→⊥` ∆
(6) ∀- right rule: Γ ` ∆, A [a]
Γ ` ∆,∀xA [x] —as long as a, the eigenvariable of the rule,
does not occur in the conclusion (“denominator”) of the rule.
(7) ∀- left rule: Γ, A [a] ` ∆
Γ, ∀xA [x] ` ∆
(8) The modified “TR” modal rule:
∀Γ,Γ ` A
Φ,Γ ` A,Ψ 
Definition 5.2 (GLTS Rules [32])
(1)–(7) As for GTKS, but instead of TR see GLR below:
(8) The modified “GLR” modal rule:
∀Γ,Γ,A ` A
Φ,Γ ` A,Ψ
The Γ and ∆ in the rules are called the “side formulae” (s.f.); the resulting
single formula in the “denominator” in rules (2)–(8) is the “principal formula”
(p.f.) of the rule (for example, formula A → B is the p.f. of rule (3)); rule (1)
has A as principal formula. The single formulae displayed in the “numerators” of
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(2)–(8) are the “minor formulae” (m.f.) of the rule (for example, formula A and B
are the m.f. of rule (3)). A numerator sequent is a premise while the denominator
sequent is the conclusion of the rule. Φ and Ψ in rule (8) of both definitions
are weakening and strengthening parts respectively. A in 5.2(8) is the diagonal
formula. We call the rule (2) “Y-type” (as adjective) because of its shape. All the
other rules are “I-type”. 
Remark 5.3 The departure from [28, 42] in using here ∀Γ in the premise of TR
and GLR, rather than using Γ, permits a central part of the proof (given in [30, 32])
—that GTKS and GLTS are equivalent to M3 and ML3 respectively— to conclude
successfully. That is the part of the proof that derives in GTKS (and GLTS) the
common axiom schema A→ ∀xA of M3 and ML3. 
Definition 5.4 (Theorems) A theorem, or derivedsequent, is defined recursively
to be one of:
(1) A sequent of one of the two types in rule (1). We say it is derived with order
0, or that it is an axiom.
(2) A sequent of the same type as in the denominator of rule (2) provided the
two corresponding sequents in the numerator are also theorems. If the latter
two are derived with orders m and n, then the former is derived with order
1 + max(m,n).
(3) A sequent of the same type as in the denominator of rules (3–8) provided
the corresponding sequent in the numerator is also a theorem. If the latter is
derived with order m, then the former is derived with order 1 +m. 
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Remark 5.5 The above recursive definition of theorems implicitly defines a tree
—a proof tree— with root labeled by the theorem. This root has one (case where
an I-rule was the last one applied) or two subtrees (case where the Y-rule was the
last one applied), which have root(s) labeled by the premise(s) of the last rule used
to derive the theorem. The leafs of the proof tree are labeled by the axioms.
A derivable sequent may be derived with many different proof trees, and there-
fore with many different orders as the latter depend on the particular proof we have
in mind. Thus the sentence “Γ ` ∆ is (a theorem) provable (or derivable) with
order m” simply means that it is possible to derive said sequent with order m.
We note the absence of weakening/strengthening rules, unlike the original
formulation of Gentzen’s in the case of classical logic. This is so because it is
desirable to introduce weakening and strengthening as admissible rather than as
primary rules in a Gentzen logic, of which we aim to develop the proof theory.
For example, proofs by induction on the height of proof trees are much simpler in
the absence of such primary rules. This approach was earlier followed in [29],28
where his weakening/strengthening “structural rules” are admissible, and was also
present in [33, 28]. The second of the last two references incorporates weakening
and strengthening parts in TR and GLR and in the rules under (1), just as we do.
See also the proof of 5.7 below. 
The following theorems and corollaries hold in both GTKS and GLTS. The
28Schu¨tte, loc. cit. uses a generalisation of sequent calculus for first-order classical and Intu-
itionistic logic, where his “negative” and “positive” parts generalise Gentzen’s “antecedent” and
“succedent” formulae. Nevertheless, his techniques adapted to Gentzen’s setting make it a straight-
forward matter to not require weakening/strengthening as primary rules.
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proofs are indebted to [29] and were adapted in the sequent setting in [30, 32].
We include the proofs for 5.6, 5.7 and 5.9 and omit the others as being similar.
Theorem 5.6 (cf. [30, 32, 29]) If (Γ ` ∆) [a] is provable with order m and b is
some other free variable, then (Γ ` ∆) [b] is provable with order ≤ m.
Proof By induction on the order of derivation, m, of (Γ ` ∆)[a]. For m = 0,
(Γ ` ∆)[a] is an axiom. Then so is (Γ ` ∆)[b]. For the induction step we prove
the case for m > 0. Cases (2)–(8) are numbered by the rule number (Definition
5.1) of the last rule applied in deriving (Γ ` ∆)[a].
(2) (Γ ` ∆)[a] = Γ[a], A[a] → B[a] ` ∆[a]. Thus the premises of the rule,29
Γ[a], A[a]→ ⊥ ` ∆[a] and Γ[a], B[a] ` ∆[a], are each derived with orders
< m. By the I.H., Γ[b], A[b] → ⊥ ` ∆[b] and Γ[b], B[b] ` ∆[b] are derived
with orders < m, thus Γ[b], A[b]→ B[b] ` ∆[b] is derived with order ≤ m.
(3) (Γ ` ∆)[a] = Γ[a] ` ∆[a], A[a] → B[a]. Then the premise Γ[a], A[a] `
∆[a], B[a] is derived with order < m. By I.H. so is Γ[b], A[b] ` ∆[b], B[b],
from which Γ[b] ` ∆[b], A[b]→ B[b] is derived with order ≤ m.
(4), (5) We omit the similar cases for these rules.
(6) (Γ ` ∆)[a] = Γ[a] ` Θ[a], ∀xA[a, x]. The premise Γ[a] ` Θ[a], A[a, a0]
is derivable with order < m, where a0 is the eigenvariable used. Let a1
be a new variable that does not occur in (Γ ` ∆)[a] and is distinct from
29In each case of propagating the claim from order < m to order m, we indicate without com-
ment the p.f. for each rule considered, for example, A[a]→ B[a] here.
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b. Applying the I.H. twice —first changing a0 into a1 and then a into b—
we get Γ[b] ` Θ[b], A[b, a1], which is derivable with order < m.30 Thus,
Γ[b] ` Θ[b],∀xA[b, x] —i.e., (Γ ` ∆)[b]— is derivable with order ≤ m,
with eigenvariable a1.
(7) (Γ ` ∆)[a] = Θ[a], ∀xA[a, x] ` ∆[a]. The premise Θ[a], A[a, c] ` ∆[a] is
derivable with order < m and so is Θ[b], A[b, c] ` ∆[b] by I.H.
Applying the rule to the latter we derive Θ[b],∀xA[b, x] ` ∆[b] with order
≤ m.
(8) (Γ ` ∆)[a] = Φ[a],Ω[a] ` A[a],Ψ[a]. The premise ∀Ω[a],Ω[a] `
A[a] is derivable with order < m. By the I.H. so is ∀Ω[b],Ω[b] ` A[b].
Thus Φ[b],Ω[b] ` A[b],Ψ[b] is derivable with order ≤ m by an appli-
cation of the same rule. It is noted that, since boxed formulae have no free
variables, A[a] = A[b] and Ω[a] = Ω[b]; moreover ∀Ω[a] = ∀Ω[b]
since ∀Ω has no free variables either.
The last case was argued based on rule TR, but the proof based on rule
GLR is entirely similar, the presence of the diagonal formula A in the
antecedent of the premise not adding any complexity. 
Theorem 5.7 (Weakening; cf. [30, 32, 33, 29]) For either GTKS or GLTS, if Γ `
∆ is derived with order m then Φ,Γ ` ∆ is derivable with order ≤ m.
30Since a0 does not occur in Γ[a] ` Θ[a],∀xA[a, x], (Γ[a] ` Θ[a], A[a, a0])[a0 := a1] =
Γ[a] ` Θ[a], A[a, a1].
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Proof By induction on the order of derivation, m, of Γ ` ∆. For m = 0, Γ ` ∆
is an axiom. Then so is Φ,Γ ` ∆. For the induction step we prove the case for
m > 0. Cases (2)–(8) are numbered by the rule number of the last rule applied in
deriving Γ ` ∆.
(2) Suppose Γ, A → B ` ∆ is derived with order m. Thus the premises of the
rule,31 Γ, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ, B ` ∆, are each derived with orders < m. By
the I.H., Φ,Γ, A → ⊥ ` ∆ and Φ,Γ, B ` ∆ are derived with orders < m,
thus Φ,Γ, A→ B ` ∆ is derived with order ≤ m using the same rule.
(3), (4), (5) We omit the similar cases for these rules.
(6) Let Γ ` ∆ = Γ ` Θ,∀xA[x]. The premise Γ ` Θ, A[a0] is derivable with
order < m, where a0 is the eigenvariable used. By 5.6, Γ ` Θ, A[a1] is
derivable with order < m, where a1 is a new variable that does not occur in
Φ,Γ ` ∆. By the I.H. Φ,Γ ` Θ, A[a1] is derivable with order < m and thus
so is Φ,Γ ` Θ,∀xA[x] with order ≤ m and eigenvariable a1.
(7) We omit this case as it is similar to the previous.
(8) Γ ` ∆ = Θ,Ω ` A,Ψ. The premise ∀Ω,Ω ` A is derivable with
order < m. Thus Φ,Θ,Ω ` A,Ψ is derivable with order ≤ m by an
application of TR.
This case was argued about rule TR (and the I.H. was not used), but the
31Once again, we implicitly indicate the p.f. in each case considered, for example, A→ B here.
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proof for rule GLR is entirely similar, the presence of the diagonal formula
A in the antecedent of the premise not adding any complexity. 
Theorem 5.8 (Strengthening; cf. [30, 32]) For either GTKS or GLTS, if Γ ` ∆
is derived with order m then Γ ` ∆,Θ is derivable with order ≤ m.
Proof Similar to the proof of 5.7. 
Theorem 5.9 (Inversion rules; cf. [30, 32, 33, 29]) For either GTKS or GLTS,
we have
(1) If Γ, A→ B ` ∆ is derivable with order m, then each of Γ, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ and
Γ, B ` ∆ are derivable with order ≤ m.
(2) If Γ ` ∆, A → B is derivable with order m, then Γ, A ` ∆, B is derivable
with order ≤ m.
(3) If Γ ` ∆, A → ⊥ is derivable with order m, then Γ, A ` ∆ is derivable with
order ≤ m.
(4) If Γ, A → ⊥ ` ∆ is derivable with order m, then Γ ` ∆, A is derivable with
order ≤ m.
(5) If Γ ` ∆,∀xA [x] is derivable with order m, then Γ ` ∆, A [a] is derivable
with order ≤ m (for any choice of a).
Proof By induction on the order of derivation m. We include the standard proof
for a few cases and refer the reader to the literature for the ones we omit.
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(1) If Γ, A → B ` ∆ is an axiom then so is Γ ` ∆ since A → B is not atomic,
and hence so are Γ, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ, B ` ∆.
For the induction step we have two cases:
• Case where A → B is the p.f. of rule (2) that derived Γ, A → B ` ∆.
Then the rule premises, Γ, A → ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ, B ` ∆ are each derived
with order < m by 5.4.
• Case whereA→ B is not the p.f. of the rule (k) (for k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
that derived Γ, A→ B ` ∆.
Consider the subcase where the Y-rule was the last applied with p.f.
X → Y other than A → B, that is, Γ = Γ′, X → Y . The premises
Γ′, A → B,X → ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ′, A → B, Y ` ∆ are derivable with
order < m each.
By the I.H., the sequents Γ′, A→ ⊥, X → ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ′, B,X → ⊥ `
∆, as well as Γ′, Y, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ and Γ′, B, Y ` ∆ are also derivable
with orders < m, Therefore, applying rule (2) to the first and third, and
then to the second and fourth, we derive (with order ≤ m) Γ, A→ ⊥ `
∆ and Γ, B ` ∆, respectively.
Similar argument for the I-rules 3–7.
Finally, consider the subcase where the TR or GLR was used to derive
Γ, A → B ` ∆. Here the subcase that A → B is a side formula cannot
apply, since the s.f. are of the form ∀X or X . If on the other hand
A→ B is a weakening formula, then Γ, A→ B ` ∆ was obtained with
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order m from a sequent of the form Γ′ ` C that was derived with order
< m. Applying TR (or GLR) to the latter, but changing the weakening
part A→ B to B, we obtain Γ, B ` ∆ with order≤ m. Then we invoke
again the rule on the same premise, this time applying the weakening
part A→ ⊥ to obtain Γ, A→ ⊥ ` ∆ also with order ≤ m.
(5) If Γ ` ∆, ∀xA[x] is an axiom then so is Γ ` ∆, A[a] for any choice of a since
∀xA[x] is not atomic.
For the induction step we consider first the case where ∀xA[x] is the p.f. of
rule (6) that derived Γ ` ∆,∀xA[x]. Then Γ ` ∆, A[a0] is derived with order
< m by 5.4, where a0 is the eigenvariable used. By 5.6, for any a, Γ ` ∆, A[a]
is derived with order < m as well.32
Say, on the other hand, that ∀xA[x] is not the p.f. in the rule (k) (k =
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) that derived Γ ` ∆,∀xA[x].
If the Y-rule was used to derive the previous sequent, then Γ = Γ′, X → Y
and the premises used were Γ′, X → ⊥ ` ∆,∀xA[x] and Γ′, Y ` ∆, ∀xA[x],
each being derivable with order < m. By the I.H. each of Γ′, X → ⊥ `
∆, A[b] and Γ′, Y ` ∆, A[b] is derivable with order < m —using a b that does
not occur in Γ′ ∪∆ ∪ {∀xA[x], X, Y }. By rule (2), Γ ` ∆, A[b] is derivable
with order ≤ m, and an application of 5.6 allows us to use any free variable a
in the place of b.
32Recall that a0 occurs nowhere in Γ ` ∆, so the substitution (Γ ` ∆, A[a0])[a0 := a] will be
localised to A[a0].
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The case of I-rules 3–7 is argued similarly.
Finally, let TR (or GLR) be the rule applied last to derive Γ ` ∆,∀xA[x],
from premise Γ′ ` C, itself derived with order < m. Thus ∀xA[x] must be a
strengthening formula and reapplying TR (or GLR) with a different strength-
ening, A[a] for any a we may choose, derives Γ ` ∆, A[a] with order ≤ m.

5.2 Reducibility
Definition 5.10 In either GTKS or GLTS we define that a sequent Γ ` ∆ is
irreducible if one of the following applies:
(1) ⊥ ∈ Γ.
(2) There exists an atomic formula, A, such that A ∈ Γ ∩∆.
(3) The members of Γ are atomic or boxed and ∆ is atomic,⊥ /∈ Γ and Γ∩∆ = ∅.
We say that a sequent Γ ` ∆ is reducible if that sequent is not irreducible. 
Definition 5.11 In either GTKS or GLTS, and in the case of a reducible sequent,
at least one rule from Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 applies backwards to yield a pre-
decessor sequent. The predecessor relation between so related sequents, Γ′ ` ∆′
(predecessor) and Γ ` ∆ we will denote by ≺, that is, Γ′ ` ∆′ ≺ Γ ` ∆. 
Remark 5.12 In either GTKS or GLTS the relation ≺ is well-founded —that is,
there can be no infinite “descending” ≺-paths because each rule, (2)–(8), when
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applied “backwards” from Γ ` ∆, reduces the number of occurrences of one of
the connectives→,∀, in Γ ` ∆. 33
The case of TR/GLR calls for some more elaboration: Each backwards ap-
plication reduces the number of occurrences of  in the succedent and so after
a finite number of (backwards) steps neither of the two will be applicable. Now,
each of these two rules introduces a ∀Ω in the antecedent, which will be eventu-
ally depleted by reverse applications of rule (7). This latter rule does not introduce
any new TR/GLR-specific p.f. to the right of ` that were not already subformulae
of Γ ` ∆. Finally, we note that a reverse application of GLR introduces a A in
the antecedent (diagonal formula), but this is not a p.f. for any rule, and causes no
thread backwards.
Thus one can do induction along ≺ or on the reducibility rank —RR(Γ `
∆)— of Γ ` ∆, that is, the path length upwards from this sequent to an irreducible
sequent. The minimal elements of this order are the irreducible sequents.
We note that, for any Φ and Ψ, we have RR(Φ,Γ ` ∆,Ψ) ≤ RR(Γ ` ∆).
If Γ ` ∆ is derivable, then this is what 5.7 and 5.8 say. If not, then adding
weakening (strengthening) to Γ ` ∆ is effected by introducing it via applications
of TR/GLR along a reverse path along ≺, from this sequent to an irreducible (but
not an axiom) Γ′ ` ∆′; or by modifying the side formulae of Γ′ ` ∆′. Neither of
these actions lengthen the path. 
In order to explain reducibility more concretely, a couple of examples with
33The Y-rule, applied backwards, still has the→ connective in one of the predecessor sequents.
However rule (5), applied backwards, will remove it.
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sample reducibility trees will be shown:
Example 5.13
Γ,⊥ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆,⊥ → ⊥
In this example, Γ,⊥ ` ∆ is a leaf of the tree,34 namely, an irreducible se-
quent because of the 5.10 case (1) (⊥ is in the hypothesis). Applying 5.1 rule (4)
backwards on the the node Γ ` ∆,⊥ → ⊥, we can get the leaf sequent. By the
reducibility definition, Γ,⊥ ` ∆ ≺ Γ ` ∆,⊥ → ⊥.
Example 5.14
Γ, A ` ∆, A
Γ ` ∆, A→ A
Let’s assume that the formula A is atomic. In this example, Γ, A ` ∆, A is a
leaf of the tree, namely, an irreducible sequent because of the 5.10 case (2). Ap-
plying 5.1 rule (3) backwards on the the node Γ ` ∆, A→ A, we can get the leaf
sequent. By the reducibility definition, Γ, A ` ∆, A ≺ Γ ` ∆, A→ A.
Example 5.15
A,B[a] ` C[b]
A, ∀xB ` C[b]
34Recall that proof trees have the root at the bottom, and leafs at the top
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In this example,A,B andC are assumed to be all distinct atomic formulae and
the variable a is the only variable in formula B. Compared with the last example,
A,B[a] ` C[b] is an irreducible sequent (5.10 case (3)) but not an axiom because
of the 5.1 rule (1). Please note that A,∀xB ` C[b] is not derivable because the
leaf sequent is not axiom at all.
Example 5.16
A,B ` C[b]
A,B ` ∀xC
In this example, again A,B and C are assumed to be all distinct atomic for-
mulae and b is the only variable in formula C. Provided that b does not occur in
the formulas A and B, the node A,B ` C[b] is an irreducible sequent (5.10 case
(3)) is not an axiom because of the 5.1 rule (1). And then, applying the reverse
application of 5.1 rule (6) on A,B ` ∀xC, we can get A,B ` C[b]. Please note
again: A,B ` ∀xC is not derivable because the leaf sequent above is not axiom
at all.
Example 5.17
...
A[a],A,` B
∀A,A ` B
C,A ` B,D
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In this subtree, applying the modified “TR” rule backwards on the nodeC,A `
B,D, the node ∀A,A ` B will be obtained. Assume now, for simplicity, that A
has one free variable only, a. Thus, ∀A is ∀xA. As explained in the remark sec-
tion, universal quantifier ∀xA introduced by TR rule at the left side of ` will be
deleted (by 5.1 rule (7)). There are no infinite “descending”≺ paths. Additionally,
note that C,A ` B,D is of higher reducibility rank than ∀A,A ` B.
6 Cut Derivability in GTKS and GLTS
Proposition 6.1 The following two statements are equivalent for every formula
A and any Γ,∆,Θ,Ω,Φ,Ψ:
a. If Γ ` ∆, A and A,Θ ` Ω then Γ,Θ ` ∆,Ω (cut admissibility).
b. If A→ A,Φ ` Ψ then Φ ` Ψ.
Proof a. → b. Derivability of A → A,Φ ` Ψ entails that of A,Φ ` Ψ and
Φ ` Ψ, A (5.9, cases 1 and 4) and we are done by a.
b. → a. The assumption in a. entails (by weakening/strengthening) the deriv-
ability of Γ,Θ ` ∆,Ω, A and A,Γ,Θ ` ∆,Ω. By rule (2) we get A→ A,Γ,Θ `
∆,Ω. We are done by b. 
Lemma 6.2 (Cut admissibility Lemma for GTKS) For any formula A, if A →
A,Γ ` ∆ is derivable, then so is Γ ` ∆.
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Proof The proof is by induction on the ordinal
α = ω2 · C + ω ·RR +m (1)
where C is the modified complexity of A.35 —this is the primary (P.I.) or main
induction. A secondary induction (S.I.) is done along the ≺ relation on the Γ ` ∆
“companion” of A → A —more accurately on RR(Γ ` ∆)— and on occasion
we do a “local induction” (L.I.) on the order of derivation of A,Γ ` ∆, which we
typically call m in this proof. Thus we will embark on a triple induction, where C
is not allowed to increase during the induction step of either the S.I. or L.I., and
neither C nor RR are allowed to increase during the induction step of L.I.
Case 1. A is atomic.
By invertibility (Theorem 5.9, case (1) followed by case (4)), both A,Γ ` ∆
and Γ ` ∆, A are derivable. By a L.I. on the order of derivation m of
A,Γ ` ∆ we prove the derivability of Γ ` ∆.
(i) Basis. If m = 0, what if Γ ` ∆ is not itself an axiom? Then A ∈ ∆, so
Γ ` ∆ = Γ ` ∆, A is derivable, contradicting our “what if”.
(ii) Let us now take a L.I.H. and assume that A,Γ ` ∆ is obtained by one of the
rules (2)–(7) with order m. Note that A cannot be the p.f. in the application
of such rules.
35By modified complexity we mean the ordinal ω · k + r where k counts  occurrences and r
counts the total of all→,∀ occurrences in A. Thus (k, r) <
(
k + 1, r
′
)
and (k, r) < (k, r + 1) for
all k, r, r
′
.
58
• Case where the “Y-rule” derived A,Γ ` ∆: Then some A,Γ′ ` ∆ and
A,Γ′′ ` ∆ (the rule’s premises) are derivable each with order < m,
and the same is true, by weakening 5.7, forA,Γ,Γ′ ` ∆ andA,Γ,Γ′′ `
∆.
Since Γ,Γ′ ` ∆, A and Γ,Γ′′ ` ∆, A are also derivable by weakening,
the local I.H. yields the derivability of each of Γ,Γ′ ` ∆ and Γ,Γ′′ ` ∆,
and an application of the Y-rule derives Γ,Γ ` ∆ = Γ ` ∆ as needed.36
• Case where one of the “I-rules” (3)–(7) derived A,Γ ` ∆. This is
similar to and slightly simpler than the Y-case.
Note that Γ′ ` ∆ ≺ Γ ` ∆ and Γ′′ ` ∆ ≺ Γ ` ∆, hence RR
did not increase during this induction step (cf. also concluding part of
Remark 5.12).
(iii) A,Γ ` ∆ is obtained by rule (8). Thus, A is a weakening formula, but then
Γ ` ∆ is also derivable by omitting the weakening A (the L.I.H. was not
needed in this case).
Case 2. A = B → C.
By 5.9, cases (1) and (4), we can also derive B → C,Γ ` ∆ and Γ `
∆, B → C; and, again by invertibility, we can derive S1 = Γ ` ∆, B —thus
36Recall that what we are proving via this “local” induction is that if both A,Γ ` ∆ and Γ `
∆, A, are provable then so is Γ ` ∆. Thus, the acrobatics involving weakening are needed to
ensure that the “and” holds: Even though, e.g., A,Γ′ ` ∆ is provable, we cannot necessarily
expect that so is Γ′ ` ∆, A. But Γ,Γ′ ` ∆, A is provable!
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also S ′1 = Γ ` ∆, C,B— and S2 = C,Γ ` ∆ and also S3 = B,Γ ` ∆, C
by case (2). Now, we can derive S4 = B → B,Γ ` ∆, C from S ′1 and S3 and
rule (2); similarly, we can deriveC → C,B → B,Γ ` ∆ from S4 and the obvious
weakening of S2. We can finally apply the P.I.H. twice to get Γ ` ∆.
Case 3. A = ∀xB. Now, S = ∀xB,Γ ` ∆ and Γ ` ∆,∀xB are derivable
by 5.9. We do a L.I. on the order of derivation m of S, as before, to show that
Γ ` ∆ is derivable.
(i) Now, if S is an axiom, then so is Γ ` ∆ since ∀xB is not atomic.
(ii) Otherwise, let first A,Γ ` ∆ be obtained by one of the rules (2)–(7) with
order m. We have the cases,
(a) A is the p.f. in the derivation ofA,Γ ` ∆. ThenB[a],Γ ` ∆ is derivable
for some a and so is Γ ` ∆, B[a] by 5.9, last case. Hence B[a] →
B[a],Γ ` ∆ is, by rule (2), and we are done by the P.I.H. (the L.I.H was
not needed here).
(b) A is not p.f. in the derivation of A,Γ ` ∆, and A,Γ ` ∆ is obtained by
one of the rules (2)–(7) with order m.
• Case where the Y-rule derived A,Γ ` ∆: Exactly as in the corre-
sponding case under (ii) of Case 1.
• Case where some I-rule among 3–7 derived A,Γ ` ∆. Again as in
(ii) of Case 1.
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The same note regarding RR as in Case 1(ii) applies here as well.
(iii) A,Γ ` ∆ is obtained by rule (8). Exactly as (iii) under Case 1.
Case 4. A = B.
(I) Γ ` ∆ is irreducible. Thus, B,Γ ` ∆ is derivable as an initial sequent,
which means that Γ ` ∆ is also an initial sequent.
(II) Γ ` ∆ is reducible. We have two subcases:
(i) A,Γ ` ∆ is obtained by one of the rules (2)–(7) with order m. As
A cannot be p.f. in any of rules (2)–(7), sub-subcase iib of Case 3
applies, and we have nothing further to add here. The note inserted at
the end of Case 1(ii) applies here as well: RR did not increase.
(ii) (Adapting Brighton’s approach ([8]) in this case.) Case where the only
applicable rule to Γ ` ∆ is (8). By invertibility, S = B,Γ ` ∆ and
S
′
= Γ ` ∆,B are derivable. Now, if B ∈ Γ or B ∈ ∆, then
S = Γ ` ∆ or S ′ = Γ ` ∆ respectively, and we are done. So let
B /∈ Γ ∪ ∆, and let us also pay no attention to the possibility that
B is weakening/strengthening introduced by the TR rule, as then we
are done immediately.
Thus, S and S ′ were obtained by proofs ending as:
S1
S
=
∀B,B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D
B,Φ,Γ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
` D,Ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
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and
S2
S ′
=
∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` B
Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ,B
Now, the derivable S1, S2 above can also derive
S3 = B,Γ′ ` D
S4 = Γ′ ` B
and
S2′ = B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` B, this by weakening,
respectively. Now, we can obtain the derivable sequent S5 = B →
B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` B from S2′ and S4 (via (2) and (5)), and thus also
S5′ = B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` ∀B by repeated application of rule (6)
—note that the left hand side of ` in S5 is closed. We can also ob-
tain S6 = ∀B,B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D from S1 and S4. Thus
we can next obtain S7 = ∀B → ∀B,B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D
from S5′ and S6. We can now apply the P.I.H. to obtain S8 = B →
B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D from S7 (recall that ∀B has lower (modified) com-
plexity than B).
But ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D ≺ Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ = Γ ` ∆, thus, by S.I.H.,
∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ` D is derivable. This, via TR, derives Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ =
Γ ` ∆. 
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Lemma 6.3 (Cut admissibility Lemma for GLTS) For any formula A, if A →
A,Γ ` ∆ is derivable, then so is Γ ` ∆.
Proof As in the proof of 6.2 except for Case 4(IIii): The only applicable rule
to Γ ` ∆ is GLR. By invertibility, S = B,Γ ` ∆ and S ′ = Γ ` ∆,B are
derivable. Now, if B ∈ Γ or B ∈ ∆, then S = Γ ` ∆ or S ′ = Γ ` ∆
respectively, and we are done. So letB /∈ Γ∪∆, and let us also pay no attention
to the possibility thatB is weakening/strengthening introduced by the GLR rule,
as then we are done immediately.
Thus, S and S ′ were obtained by proofs ending as:
S1
S
=
∀B,B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D ` D
B,Φ,Γ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
` D,Ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
and
S2
S ′
=
∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,B ` B
Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ,B
Now, the derivable S1, S2 above can also derive
S3 = B,Γ′ ` D
S4 = Γ′ ` B
respectively. Now, we can obtain the derivable sequent S5 = B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ `
B from S2 and S4 (via (2) and (5)), and thus also S5′ = B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ `
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∀B by repeated application of rule (6) —note that the left hand side of ` in S5 is
closed. We can also obtain S6 = ∀B,B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D ` D from S1
and S4. Thus we can next obtain S7 = ∀B → ∀B,B → B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D `
D from S5′ and S6. We can now apply the P.I.H. to obtain S8 = B →
B, ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D ` D from S7 (recall that ∀B has lower (modified) complexity
than B). But ∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D ` D ≺ Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ = Γ ` ∆, thus, by S.I.H.,
∀Γ′ ,Γ′ ,D ` D is derivable. This, via GLR, derives Φ,Γ′ ` D,Ψ = Γ `
∆. 
Theorem 6.4 (Cut admissibility for GTKS and GLTS) In each of GTKS and
GLTS, if Γ ` ∆, A and A,Θ ` Ω, then Γ,Θ ` ∆,Ω.
Proof By 6.2 and 6.3 via 6.1. 
7 Conclusion
The proof I provided in last section (5.1) has three induction hypotheses —the
modified complexity of cut formula A, the reducibility rank RR of Γ ` ∆ and
the order of derivation of A,Γ ` ∆. No doubt, this proof is of lower complex-
ity than the original GLTS proof with four Induction Hypotheses and benefiting
from the concept of reducibility, it is much shorter and more readable than the
original proof of [32]. Here the observation about the simple formulation of cut
admissibility “if Γ, A→ A ` ∆ is derivable, then so is Γ ` ∆” also helped a lot!
I am interested in further working on proof-theory for first-order modal logics,
in particular that of the very versatile ML3, evidently more much more capable
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than QGL, in that it preserves the “full” main conservation result (C) (p.21), and
admits cut elimination that QGL does not. There are many interesting questions to
be explored about it, such as its (almost certain) arithmetical completeness raised
in section 3. Can an ML3 that is allowed primary necessitation (and thus becomes
the QGLb of [27]) benefit from the formulator techniques of [31]? If not, can
these techniques be adapted? [24] proves that QGL does not enjoy the fixpoint
property; but how about ML3?
More research on ML3’s metamathematical properties is required. After my
Masters, I hope to do research about these and related questions on first-order
modal proof theory in general.
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